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GABRIEL MARCEL1S
BODY-AS-A-SUBJECT:
A PREEMINENTLY POSTMODERN NOTION
There are a number of reasons why Gabriel Marcel can be
called an avantgarde postmodernist. The first is his strong reaction
against what Joseph Natoli and Linda Hutcheon have called
"modernism's universalizing and totalizing drive" 1 such as Descartes'
use of the thinking ego as the sole foundation of his philosophy, or
idealism's search for intelligibility exclusively through the rational. The
second is his emphasis on the experiential, the individual and the
existential, as opposed to modernism's stress on the abstract, the
general and the essential. The third is his resistance to the
encapsulization of his thoughts into a system, which has led to a
liberating and empowering openness which is definitely postmodern
in 'flavor. The fourth is his "double coding", that is his valuing of
reflection simultaneously with postmodernist narratological methods,
such as dramatization in essays and/or journals, and his ongoing use
01 dramatic creations. But, as we shall see, it is his notion of the body-
as-a-subject, which incorporates the four above reasons, as weil as
adding to them those of sensualism and alterity, which is preeminently
postmodern.
There is no doubt that Marcel's thought owes its impetus to its
original reaction to Cartesianism and to idealism. This reaction
reverberates throughout his Metaphysical Journal, as weil as
informing all his later works. In both Cartesianism and idealism, it is the
loss of existence which he bemoans. He explains in the Journal that
the existence of the 'Cartesian thinking ego is of a totally different
order than the existence about which he himself is speaking. The
objective world of the cogito simply does not coincide with "the world
1Joseph Natoli and Linda Hutcheon, eds., A Postmodern Reader (NY:
SUNY Pr., 1993) p. IX.
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of existenee"2• For, the eogito guarantees the validity of a eertain
system of affirmations, and the real world would be immanent in it only
if the valid and the real could be equated, which of course they cannot
(MJ 325).
As for the idealists, they reduee Ilto a minimum the rote of
existencell (MJ 319). They carry out the reduction of existence in
order to reach intelligibility through rational definitions. They prop up
thought on existence, but then quickly lose sight of existence. They
emphasize the "objectivell quality of the object, so that the IIsubjectll
can have a grip on it, and thus leave behind "the existential aspect" of
the object (MJ 319). And, sinee the eontribution of the lIobjectll is in
fact unthinkable, idealism minimizes it. Thus, the individual
characteristics of the lIobjeet" are more and more ignored, and it
becomes "disindividualized". Moreover, sensation/feeling is also
unintelligible in itself and is therefore looked at by idealism as a
IIpriming" for the aet of thinking about the object (MJ 327).3
In fact, idealism follows to its limit the natural bent of the mind,
which is to ereate an insularity between the object and itself. What it
does is to set aside the way in which the objeet is present to or affects
the person considering it, or "the mysterious power of self-affirmation"
of the objecl. It thus IIconjures away" the sense presence of selt-
affirmation of the thing (MJ 320). It does what science does, which is
to eut off the cables which link thought to experience. It forgets the
irreducible element of experience. There is thus a very wide gulf
between its way of thinking and the "integral human experience with
its life whieh trembles with tragedy" (MJ 122).
The distinction between existence and objectivity which
Gabriel Marcel articulated increasingly clearly throughout part 1I of the
2Gabriel Marcei, Metaphysical Journal, tr. Bernard Wall, (Chicago:
Henry Regnery Co., 1952) Hereafter MJ.
31 must point out here that, probably to show the link which exists in
French between "sensation" and "sentir- (in English "sensation" and "feeling")
and which Marcel sometimes uses interchangeably, the translator Bernard
Wall has translated the French "la sensation" (cf. Journal MetaphysiquB,
Gallimard, Paris, 1935, p. 317), which appears twice on that page, the first
time as "feeling or sensation," and the second as "sensation or feeling".
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Metaphysical Journal, and which he clinched in an article called
"Existence and Objectivity· published in the Revue de Metaphysique
et de Morale in 1925, and reproduced as an appendix to the Journal,
captures the essence of his reaction to both Cartesian ra'tionalism and
idea,lism, and throws light on the direction of all his future thought.
Objectivity consists in the characteristics of a person or thing, or
of my body in which 1play no part whatsoever. It is that which does not
take me into account, that which has nothing to do with me (MJ 332-
334). Thus it is a distancing from my body, from the world, and in fact
from existence such as it is carried out by rationalists who effect a
mind/body dichotomy in order to reach indubitability, by idealists who
effect aseparation batween consciousness and reality in order to
reach pure intelligibility, and by me in my datly life as 1treat the world
and others and even myself as "shes", IIhims" or "theys".
Yet, ontologica,lIy, it is existence which has a absolute priority.
Deep within myself 1have an assurance which gives me "beyond all
possible doubt... the confused and global experience of the world
inasmuch as it is existent" (MJ 322). It is a certain intimation of the
indissoluble unity of existence and the existent. It confronts me with
the fact that "existential assurance is a pure immediacy which is
incapable of being mediated. It is also incapable of specifications (it is
not this or that) , or of any characteristics (MJ 329).
In opposition to objectivity, existence very much takes my body
into account. Basically, it is the presence of the world and of things to
me which my body reaches via feeling. There are three most
important (yet almost unexpected) terms in this definition:
"presence", "my body" and "feeling". But it is "my body", to which the
other two are intimately related, which is the crucial one, and on which
existence hinges.
When Gabriel Marcel says "my body", he is speaking of course
about the body which I am, not the body which (according to
rationalism, idealism, science and common sense) I have. The latter
body can be used in all sorts of ways, notably as an instrument for
receiving messages from the world. That I am my body means that I
am a subject in my own right - and not an object. Being a subject
connotes an indecomposable unity, or a feit unity formed by me and
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my body4. This means that the body-as-a-subject is unthinkable.
Since thought separates the subject from the object of thought, if I
think my body, it becomes an object and ceases to exist as such (MJ
275)5.
It is not until the Mystery 0' Being, in 1950, that Gabriel Marcel
used the term Itbody-as-a-subjecttl to denote the fact that "I am my
body", instead of or besides lIincarnationll which he had used until
then. In the Entretiens autour de Gabriel Marcel, he also refers to the
distinction made by the German language between Körper and Lieb,
Körper being the body as manipulable or the body as object, and Lieb
being the body-as-a-subject, or a presence which is created lias we go
on living in a way which is immanent to the body-as-objectIl6• There,
Gabriel Marcel commented that it is the body-as-a-subject which is
susceptible of surviving the body-as-object, and to whom resurrection
is promised7.
Simultaneously, when my body is a subject, reality ceases to be
a collection of objects outside me and becomes apresence, in fact we
can say, a subject is its own right. For, as Gabriel Marcel writes in the
Metaphysical Journal, IIthe world exists in the measure in which I have
relations with it which are of the same type as my relations with my
body, that is inasmuch as I am incarnate (MJ 269 and again 274). Later
on, he makes the connection between the existence of my body and
that of the world even tighter, saying that things exist in the measure .
in which they are prolongations of my body (MJ 281), or inasmuch as
they are of the same nature as my body and belong to the same world
(MJ 315). His argument is that my body is a prototype of existence, or
inversely, that every existent is a prototype of my body.
But, if things are prolongations of my body, it is obvious that the
instrumentalist view of sensations according to which my body is
4Gabriel Marcei, Etre et Avoir(Paris: Aubier, 1935) p. 15.
SBut Marcel insists that before it can be looked at as an object, it
must first of all have been feit as my body.




looked upon as an instrument, and sensation is a message
transmitted by the body, cannot be correct. For, in that case,
sensation becomes a barrier which separates the two entities, the
world and my body, which originally existed together (ontologically
speaking). In his Presence de Gabriel Marcel paper on Gabriel
Marcells methodology of the body-as-a-subject, at the Sorbonne in
1993, Paul Ricoeur called the instrumentalist notion of sensation IIthe
second knot which ties up existence"8. According to Ricoeur, Gabriel
Marcel1s untying of that knot • which strangles the access to real
sensation/feeling • is an aet of deconstruction9.
That act of deconstruction reveals to us the intimate
relationship which exists in reality between my body-as-a-subject and
sensation/feeling. Gabriel Marcel emphasizes that relationship time
and again. "My body is mine.inasmuch as, however confusedly, it is
feltll (MJ 241), he writes, and throughout the Journal and repeatedly
in later works such as Creative Fidelity, he insists that there can be a
body only when someone is feeling (MJ 270)10. And when, with G.
Marcei, we leave behind our instrumentalist view of sensation, feeling
and sensation actually become siamese twins. For, sensation is
feeling, of a very creative kind. As Marcel says powerfully: "Sensation
(=the fact of feeling, of participating in the universe which creates me
by affecting me)'1 (MJ 338).
David Applebaum does not appreciate this view of sensation.
He accuses Marcel of con'fusing feeling and sensation. "Some of
Marcells basic works flounders on an ambiguity in the notion of
8The first knot which we have to untie is objectivity whlch ties up
existence.
9Paul Ricoeur liLa Methodologie du Corps-Sujet chez Gabriel Marcein.
Round table on the Corps-Sujet, Association Presence de Gabriel Marcel
meeting, Dec. 4, 1993.
10Gabriel Marcel, Creative Fidelity, tr. Robert Rosthai, (NY: Farrar,
Straus & Co., 1964).
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feeling"11 , he writes. What concerns him is that, for Gabriel Marcei,
sensation is pregnant with affectivity. For a logical, empirical mind Iike
that of Applebaum, this is a major mistake. He is obviously not aware
of all that Marcel's distinction between existence and objectivity,
between sensation lias a manner of beingll and sensation as a
reference, entails (MJ 187). If Appelbaum were so aware, he would
have realized that it is only from the point of view of objectivity that
there is an ambiguity between Marcel's nations of sensation and of
feeling. Neither does he seem to have read the passage in the
Metaphysical Journal in which Gabriel Marcel clearly speils out that
"sensation is affection, not information" (MJ 187).
According to Applebaum's materialistic interpretation of the
body-as-a-subject, what Gabriel Marcel would have reached had he
"disambiguated" about sensation and feeling, is the nation of
IIsensing" or body consciousness, which is the ability to touch the
body from inside. He writes: "sensing supposes a build-up of
attention to the point that cotangible touch with the interior of the
body is attained"12. According to hirn, it is through this "sensing" that I
am able to acquire the intimacy with another which allows me to caU
him a "thou"J His interpretation of sensation is obviously not in
accordance with Marcel's, which is the foundation for an ethics as weil
as a philosophy of transcendence, both strongly based on feeling
and emotions.
.11David Appelbaum "On Confusing Feeling with Sensation, with
Special Reterence to the Problem of Intimacy". Bulletin de la Societe
Americaine de Philosophie de Langue Franyaise, Vol. V, No 2-3, Fall 1993, p.
26.
12lbid. p. 17. Had Applebaum studied the original French text, Journal
Metaphysique, his criticism of Marcel might have been revised. For, in
French, there exists a correlation between "sensation" and Iisentir", which
does not exist in the corresponding English terms "sensation" and "feeling".
But the translator Bernard Wall, whose translation is otherwise excellent, has
made one small error, translating the term "sensible" (used only once by
Marcel) as "sensed", whereas it should have been "teelable". And Appelbaum
has appropriated this mistranslation and used it tor his own purposes, using,
that is, the term "sensedD or "sensingU instead of "feeling", wherever Marcel
had written "sentir".
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What Appelbaum ignores completely is the fact that essential to
Marcells "sensualist metaphysics" is the notion of presence. I said
earlier that for Gabriel Marcel, existence is the presence of the world
and of things to me, which my body reaches via feeling. but, in his
rigorous "Existence and Objectivity", he writes that even to say this"
already reintroduces a duality, a distinction between subject and
object, where in reality, there exists none. He suggests that, rather
than speaking of the presence of something to someone, we must
speak of "an absolute presence". And, he once more points out that
this presence is intimately related to feeling: "It is doubtless by
evocation of the pure act of feeling, understood as interior
resonance" that we can best understand "the presence which
subtends the integrality of our experience and of any experience
whatever" (MJ 331).
It is presence which enables us to make a transition from
existence to value as weil as to transcendence. IIThat which has value
increases in us the feeling of presence whether it be ours or that of
the universe," Marcel writes. Likewise according to hirn, the more
pale, restrained, hesitant our affirmation of existence is, the less value
we have (MJ 317). This surprising but powerful statement indicates
the very important role which Marcel assigns to strong emotions in his
metaphysics and in his ethics.
I will now turn to his treatment of emotions in our "affirmation of
existence", especially in regard to our relations with other persons.
We find a great many passages dealing with the role of emotions in
our lives in the Metaphysical Journal and even more in Marcells later
works such as Creative Fidelity, The Mystery of Being and The
Existential Background of Human Dignity. They are almost always
accompanied by dramatizations, that is by references to imagined
concrete situations which help us explore with tv1arcel the meaning of
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the emotional feeling in question. 13And of course the whole of
Marcel's theater is also an exploration of human emotions as they
express our relationships, or most often our failed relationships to
others, and thus our reaching or not of community and the
transcendent. Since it deals concretely with the immediate, such as
our emotions, which philosophical reflection necessarily
conceptualizes or "mediatizes·, Marcel's theater plays a most
important role for hirn, and is very rnuch part of the double coding
which makes hirn a postmodernist.
I want to mention in passing that Marcel's emphasis on the
value of emotions places him, on this particular topic, in direct
opposition to Immanuel Kant according to whom emotions and
feelings must never playa role in the making of moral decisions. For
Kant, it is the rational alone which must guide us in the doing of our
duty, our following of the categorical imperative14
According to Gabriel Marcei, as we live out our relations to
others, we create Nadaptational bonds" which make us lose our
original self-presence so that we become strangers to ourselves, and
others in our lives da also. This is an Jlobjectification" which
corresponds, on the level of human relations, to objectivity in the
natural world, that is to losing track of existence itself. In order to
explore the occurrence of adaptational bonds, Gabriel Marcel
dramatizes it by referring to two quite different possible situations.
First, he takes the case of a man who receives a letter from a friend
telling him that he has been ill, but has now recovered and gone on a
trip. The man is not at all moved by the letter, which he takes as a
point of information, not very different from news he might have heard
13Marcel writes that he once suggested 10 his students that the only
way to deal' with a concrete situation, such as our encounter with evil is by
'ldramatizationU , that is by imagining the concrete situation of a human being
encountering evil." [Gabriel Marcei, Pour yne Bagasse TragiQye et son Au
~, (Paris: Plan, 1968) p. 196.] In her paper called IIDeath and the Tragic in
Gabriel Marcel's Philosophy" presented at the March 1992 meeting of the
Association Presence de Gabriel Marcel in Paris, Genevieve Duso made an
incisive analysis of Marcel's method of dramatization.
141mmanuel Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Mora/s.
(Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill Co., 1959).
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on the radio. The friend is definitely, for the time being, a "hirnIl for the
man, and conversely "by that very factll the man is also a "hirn tl to
himself (MJ 172). Secondly, Marcel asks us to imagine the situation of
a man who has a stable sentiment for his wife, but he comments that
between the man and his wife "no living attachrnent is established".
Rather "the attachment tends to be converted into something inert
and inanirnate" (MJ 174). The rnanls wife is therefore a tlhern for hirn
and he is a "hirn" for hirnself.
Emotion oceurs when the adaptational bonds whieh have been
ereated between two persons are broken, in one way or another. In
the case of the man who receives the letter frorn his friend, Gabriel
Mareel teils us to now imagine that the letter had "an immediate
emotive value, such as Ullm done for... 11 (MJ 172). Immediately, the
manls attitude is changed. He is very moved and feels compassion for
his friend. There has been a transition to alIweIl, to the lIexperienee of
cornmunity". And the man has been IIrevealed to himself-. For
emotions, which take us by surprise more than anything else,
beeause they are not rationally eonseious, "force the hidden me to
emergell (MJ 173).
In the ease of the man with a stable sentiment for his wife, the
adaptational bond is broken and an emotion arises when he discovers
that she has been unfaithful. IIHere emotion funetions as a reeall,1I
writes Marcel. lI 'The question concerns me, and I didn't realize it'. The
lOh but', which is at the root of the emotion, sheds retrospeetive
clarity on what interrupts or transformsu (MJ 174).
What is most interesting about the double dramatization just
diseussed is that, whereas the first emotion which breaks an
adaptational bond, that of the man with the ill friend, is definitely a
positive compassion for the friend, the second emotion which breaks
'lhe adaptational bond between the man and his wife, is probably a
negative emotion, either anger or jealousy15. Vet in both cases Marcel
sees the emotion, and espeeially the manls awareness of his emotion,
15Although it could possibly also be a positive emotion, such as
forgiveness, as in the case of Claude end Edmee in A Man of God. Cf.
Gabriel Marcel "Un Homme de Dieu" in Cliq Pieces Majeures (Paris: Pion,
1973).
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as forcing IIthe hidden I to emerge, and thus as having a positive role.
What Marcel shows in these dramatizations is that emotions
have an ontological basis, 'that is, they affect my being, they create the
person that 1am or can become. It is the mysterious element in me
which is revealed through emotions and which gives me value. It is
also this element which, Marcel says, is naccessible to invocationll (MJ
173) which I shall now discuss.
When I first read Gabriel Marcei, 1was surprised by the fact that a
philosopher used the term "invocationlt , for I associated it with the
Jitany of Holy Saturday during which the faithful invoked each of the
saints one by one and asked them to intercede and pray for them.
When I checked the definition, not too long ago, 1discovered that
while its first meaning is indeed lIa solemn entreaty for blessing or
intercession", its second meaning is "a formula for conjuring spirits". It
was then and only then that I remernbered that a great number of
passages in 'the Metaphysical Journal deal with clairvoyance,
telepathy, magie, prophecy and so on. Until that moment, 1had the
orthodox attitude ingrained in me by CathoJicism and by philosophy. I
ignored any allusions to the "conjuring of spirits".
But it is very interesting that, indeed, most of the passages in
the Journal which deal with lIinvocation" have to do with
communication with persons beyond time or beyond space, 'that is
with extrasensory perception of one kind of another. The one which I
find the most interesting and instructive concerns telepathie
hallucinations or the representation of a scene outside time and
space.
Before discussing a concrete "scene" as such, Marcel prepares
the ground by distinguishing between the material phenomenon
(from which we necessarily abstract), and the concrete scene itself
from which we cannot abstract without destroying it. Taking the case
of a shipwreck, he explains that the material phenomenon itself is
subject to time and space. It is "a non-unifiable totality of shocks"
whose characteristics are "inhuman end non-physchical tl (MJ 169).
Although a spectator could take a snapshot view and transmit it, it
takes place whether or not there is a spectator to see i1. On the other
hand, the concrete scene itself has a rea', unity, real persons take part
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in it, and because of this lIit transcends the contingent conditions of
its appearanee in time and spaee" (MJ 169).
With this distinetion in mind, Gabriel Marcel asks us to imagine a
man who, although he was not present at the death of his friend,
subsequently recalls the scene. Many people would object that since
he was not present at the scene, he cannot possibly recall it. But,
according to Marcei, the only question which should be asked is
whether there was a unity between the two friends, whether "we were
one" at the time the scene took place, my friend and I, or became one
subsequently. "For this unity to oceur, it seems there must first of all
be an appeal, an invocation, an labide with mel, that is more or less
clearlyenunciated. Secondly, this appeal must be heard, though the
subjeet does not necessarily know that he hears it. It is on the basis of
this mysterious co-esse that the vision is built Up" (MJ 170).
Mareel emphasizes that "invoking a being is different from and
more than thinking of hirn (her)" (MJ 171). It must be based on a
reality, have a metaphysical foundation. The "abide with meu must be
able to be eonverted into "1 will appear to you". I ean only invoke
someone with whom 1 have, or might have, a certain degree of
intimacy. The word IIwith", which connotes a psychical unity or feit
community, is very important here. An invocation cannot be
etficacious without it.
It was not until 1947 that Mareel would point out to those of us
who had not noticed it (the great majority of us, I am afraid, and I
among them) the tremendous influence of metapsyehism (or other
kinds of extrasensory perception) on his thought. IITo listen to the
most intimate and pregnant aspect of our experience enables us to
take off, like an airplane, and look at reality with new eyes," he wrote16•
This is exactly what took place in the case of invocation.
Marcel's "listening" made hirn realize the importanee of the psyehical
unity, of the feit eommunity, in the invocation essential to telepathie
hallucination. It made him look at love, at my relationship to a thou,
16Gabriel Marcel liDe l'Audace en Metaphysique". Revue de
Metaphysique et de Mora/e, 1947. Reprinted at the end of Percees vers un
Ailleurs. (Paris: Artheme Fayard, 1973), p. 418.
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with new eyes. He eould now say most foreefully that: "Love rises Uke
an invoeation, like an appeal of the I to the 1" (MJ 221, 222); and that
the opposition he had suggested earlier between invocation and
indication, also applies to love. For the lover invokes the ego of the
thou, not the ego souree of information (MJ 222).
But Mareel's listening proved even more sueeessful in the ease
of my relationship to God. For here, invoeation takes on an even
greater importance since it is my most frequent means of relating to
"the Absolute Thou'l. Gabriel Marcel here finds himself more than
ever on the dividing line between existenee and objeetivity. Might not
the fact that I relate to the Thou via invoeation make God's existenee
depend on my relation to hirn? If however, I say that God's existenee
is an objeetive fact which does not depend in any way on my
relationship to hirn, am I not on the other hand making Godls
existenee fall into pure objeetivity, that is into an abstraction?
In order to elucidate the question, Marcel returns to his
distinction between objectivity and existence, but by bringing in the
questi9n of invocation in its relation to existence he deepens the
whole investigation. One of the ways to define objectivity is to say
that it is "the universality of eertsin characteristies which ean be
reeognized by any mind in good faith" (MJ 281). This necessarily
eliminates anything which comes from me and leads to a network of
abstractions and to a minimization of existenee. For, as we saw earlier,
existence is only in relation to me, to my body as a subject.
It is here that the role of invocation and its relation to the
existence of God enters the picture. Invoeation is experiential.
Objectivity plays no role whatever in it. to invoke is the opposite of IIto
think of'l. For invoeation to take place, there must be a co-esse, a
community. But, someone may ask, how can I be sure that a
community exists? Can I not be mistaken by the degree of intimacy 1
have with another being? (MJ 283). Marcel's answer is that verification
is necessary as long as the thou, for whatever reason, remains a hirn
"about whom 1reserve for myself the possibility of saying' wretehed
fellow, he deeeived me, 'he abused my eonfidenee"', that is, as long
as we are in the realm of objeetivity. But when the thou is only a thou
"credit is no longer aecorded with reservations about verification, it is
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open and unconditional" (MJ 287) 17. Marcel concludes that IIthe thou
is to invocation what the object is to judgmentll (MJ 286).
Marcel's listening has propelled hirn by a kind of extrapolation
from the presence of the existing world in time and space to the
invocation of God out of time and space, both reached via my body-
as-a-subject. The occurrence of intermediary levels of existence
(bodies existing beyond our time whether in the past or in the future,
or beyond our physical space, as weil as of spirits who were once
bodies), and of intermediary levels of 'relationships (clairvoyance,
telepathic hallucination, metapsychism, etc.) has certainly fueled the
propulsion and the extrapolation. But, the most interesting point,
which Marcel stresses continuously is that our way of reaching each of
these types of existence, is always similar: presence, communion,
invocation. The essential element is always the co-esse, the
psychical unity, the feit community.
But what is listening - if not recollection or second reflection -
each of them the fairy's wand which transforms objectivity to
existence? For, through listening/second reflection I can recuperate
the existence lost by the objectification of a first reflection, I can
reestablish "in all its continuity that living tissue which imprudent
analysis tore asunder" (MJ 334). Or "1 can knowingly reestablish the
state of nondivision that had been broken by rudimentary reflectionll
(MJ 336), thus returning to unity and community. .
But, essential to the re-creation of the lost unity is my re-
identification with my body, or my re-integration with my body (MJ
336). Whereas in the abstraction of objectification, lieft behind life,
the concrete and my body, as I recollect through second reflection, I
turn again towards the body-as-a-subject that I am without abandoning
anything. On the contrary, I find a more complete and concrete life.
I have suggested in 'lhis paper that Gabriel Marcel is a
postmodernist in a number of ways. There is his insistence on the
impossibility of thinking existence - insistence which is the fruit of his
strang reaction against rationalism's and idealism's .tendencies to
17And Marcel adds "At this point, we can see the indissoluble
connection between faith and charity" (MJ 283).
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distort it or reduce it. There is his emphasis on "integral human
experiencelt - emphasis which is the result of his choice to choose
existence rather than to negate it (MJ 322). There is his decision, very
early on in his philosophical career, to avoid the systematic exposition
of his thought - whose systematization would have nullified his
concrete approach to existence (MJ VII). As in the case of later
postmodernists, this decision led Marcel to a truly liberating and
empowering openness, as we saw for example in the case of his
listening to the lessons of telepathic hallucination. There is also his
double coding - such as his use of dramatization, together with
philosophical reflection • whose fruitfulness we saw in a number of
instances.
I have also suggested that Gabriel Marcel's notion of body-as-a-
subject incorporates the four above ways in which he is a
postmodernist. For, it is because I am one with my body that
rationalism or idealism cannot abstract from it without tearing apart the
living tissue of existence. And it is only when my body is a subject that
the world exists for me; and, when I have lost that existence through
objectification, it is only through reintegration with my body that I can
recuperate it. It is because I am a body-as-a-subject who experiences
his or her own individual life, that existence cannot. be thought or
systematized. And .it is because he wanted to express and explore
the presence, 'the emotions and the invocation possible for the body-
as-a-subject that Gabriel Marcel had recourse to dramatizations and to
drama, as weil as to philosophical reflection.
But, over and above all thiS, we find the postmodern themes of
sensualism and alterity inherent in the notion of the body-as-a-
subject. Marcel calied his metaphysics "sensualisticll, because for
him, sensation (the pre$ence of my body, of the world and of others),
and feelings are all intricately linked to my body-as-a-subject.
Simultaneously, alterity is the quintessence of the body-as-a-subject,
which is one with itself only when it is in communion with the world,
with others, and with God. It is, then, all these aspects of the body-as-
a-subject which make it a preeminently postmodernist notion.
Cambridge, MA
82
GUILLEMINE OE LACOSTE
